Abstract. Rue to the dynamic nature of Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks (WAHNs) and the ntulti-node involvement in most W M N applications, group key management has been proposed for eflcient suppor-t of secure communications.
One major challenge to realizing the full potential of typical security goals of WAHNs. WAHNs can be subject to different types of attacks from a variety of adversaries that target one or more of these security goals. Cryptography is the most common countermeasure for security attacks, with which nodes are assigned a data key(s) to encrypt and decrypt messages and an administrative key(s) to confidentially change the data key(s).
Since operations in WAHNs are inherently collaborative, where the autonomous nodes forming the WAHN collectively perform tasks, secure group communications are necessary for supporting effkient node cooperation. Key management is a core component in any secure group communication, The use of message encryption in group communications requires that each authorized member of a secure network has knowledge of one or more communication key(s) shared by the group of nodes. Numerous conditions may introduce the need to evict a node, or a set of nodes. For example, nodes may experience failure due to energy depletion. Also nodes may be compromised and exhibit anomalous behavior. When a member node is evicted from the group, the communication keys known to that member must be changed in order to maintain message secrecy. All remaining group members receive the new data keys by secure transmission, which is typically accomplished by broadcasting a message containing the new key(s) to the group. Such a message must be indecipherable to the evicted member in order to prevent it from obtaining the new key.
Exclusion Basis System (EBS) offers a combinatorial group key management protocol that exploits the trade-off between the number of administrative keys, "k", and the number of re-keying messages rcm'r [3] . A set of ( k m ) administrative keys is used to support a set of N nodes, where each node is assigned a distinct combination of "k" keys. A node can be simply admitted to the group by assigning one of the unused set of "K' keys out of the total of C(k+m, k) distinct combinations. Eviction of a compromised node can be performed by broadcasting replacement of the '%" keys that the evicted node knows using the "m" keys that the node does not know.
However, EBS based key management can be prone to collusion attacks [4]. Two nodes collude when they share their keys with each other. In other words, colluding nodes would grow their knowledge about the network security measures. When using the EBS scheme, keys are reused in multiple nodes and only key combinations are unique. Therefore, it is conceivable that few compromised nodes can collude and reveal all the keys employed in the network to an adversary. Such a scenario is considered as capturing the entire network since the adversary would be capable of revealing all encrypted communications in the network. Optimal assignment of key combinations to nodes so that the scope of collusion is prevented from widening to the level of capturing the network is a classical resource allocation problem and is thus NP-hard in nature. In this paper, we present an efficient heuristic for key assignment that reduces the probability of capturing the network. Our approach exploits the physical proximity of nodes so that a node would share most keys with reachable nodes. The main idea is to increase the number of nodes that need to be compromised for revealing a11 the employed keys.
In the balance of this section we describe the considered system and threat models, and discuss related work. Section 2 analyzes the collusion problem in EBS and presents our approach for collusion prevention. The performance is evaluated in Section 3 and the paper concludes in Section 4.
System and Threat Models
A WAHN is a collection of autonomous nodes that together set up a topology without the support of-a physical networking infrastructure. Communications among nodes are via multi-hop wireless broadcast channels with limited transmission range. In this paper, we consider applications in which nodes are stationary. We also assume that the physical location and communication range of all nodes in a WAHN are known. A good match for such a model is an unattended wireless sensor network employed for remote military reconnaissance or in a disaster relief environment.
The wireless nature of WAHNs renders them susceptible to various attacks, especially when deployed in hostile and unattended environments. In this paper we mainly consider an adversary that tries to manipulate the system through compromising some network nodes. We do not assume the nodes to be tamper resistant and therefore they can be captured and tampered with. When a node gets compromised, we assume that all the information including the keys of the node is revealed. A simplifying assumption in our design is that the adversary does nut launch a coordinated attack, i.e., if more than one node were to be captured, a compromised node would not be aware of the location of other compromised nodes unless they are their immediate neighbors. In addition, we assume that the adversary does not have any prior knowledge of what is stored at each node and thus cannot selectively direct the attack to a particular node based on what that node has.
As mentioned earlier, the goal of the adversary is to uncover the keys used in the system so that he/she can discem the network operation. To achieve such a goal, the adversary attacks individual ' nodes and fosters collusion among compromised nodes. The main objective of node collusion is to incrementally aggregate the uncovered keys of individual nodes to a level that allows revealing all encrypted traffc in the network. The following scenarios can be identified for the compromised nodes to collude: a) The compromised nodes have direct communication links making collusion to be very subtle and hard to prevent. b) The compromised nodes can only communicate through multi-hops requiring the compromised nodes to be aware of the IocatiodID of other compromised nodes.
c) The adversary sets up separate channels for compromised nodes to communicate implying a coordinated network attack which is not handled by our approach. We argue that the open communication among compromised nodes or with a coordination center would make it easy tu detect and thwart the attack. In addition, the adversary would have to provide an independent radio.
Our focus in this paper is to counter the scenario in (a)
above through careful assignment of keys to communicating neighboring nodes. A fitting example of the assumed model of attacks is in a battlefield or in a border monitoring applications. In such environments, attacks are typically covert and start localized in scope before spreading. The goal of our key assignment approach is to assign the keys in such a way, that even though compromised nodes may collude and share their keys, an adversary would not be able to access all the keys of the network unless he/she remains without detection for an extended period of time. In other words, we try to reduce the probability that the entire network will be captured. It should be noted that we assume that the network is empowered with some intrusion detection mechanism so that a persistent adversary would not eventually capture the network.
Related Work
Many group key management protocols have been proposed in the literature [SI. The objective of most of these protocols is to balance communications with storage. ELK [6] and Koronos [7] also attempt to balance security and efficiency by using small-size hints and batch re-keying respectively. A major drawback that hampers the use of most of these group key management protocols in WAHNs is the lack of support for faulty and misbehaving nodes, and the overhead incurred to support key management activities including setup and re-keying. Protecting against collusion attacks also is a problem that has not been adequately addressed in WAHN environments.
Quite recently, the Hybrid Key Tree (HKT) was proposed in [XI to balance security and efficiency using a two level hybrid key tree. HKT has a sub-linear storage complexity at the controller due to the use of clusters. Cluster sizes are adjusted to resist colhsion. Another effort is reported in [4f proposing an EBS-based distributed key management solution for cohsion resistance among evicted nodes. However, their work does not consider collusion among active nodes currently in session. In addition, a distinguishing feature of our solution is the use of node proximity to reduce the probability of collusion.
Collusion Prevention
Collusion implies that two or more parties collaborate by secretly sharing their knowledge in order to gain access to certain information that they are not authorized to have. In our system a collusion attack can be possible when compromised nodes are in the transmission range of one another. Such nodes can collude by combining their set of known keys and thus expanding their capabilities in overcoming the network security measures.
In the next subsection we analyze the potential for a collusion attack to lead to capturing the network and develop a metric for quantifying such a potential. Subsection 2.2 builds on this analysis and presents a key assignment algorithm that increases the network resilience to collusion.
2.1.
We define a neighborhood of a node nl as all those nodes, which are in the transmission range of nl. In order to coIlude, two nodes must be in the transmission range of one another, otherwise they have to collude through a third party. Collusion is most likely to occur when two neighboring nodes are compromised. The compromise of a node implies that the node has been captured by an a d v e r s q and can be manipulated to collude. As a result of collusion, two colluding nodes would each know their own keys as well as the keys of the node it has colluded with.
Collusion is transitive in nature. If nl is a neighbor of n2. n2 is a neighbor of FIJ, and nJ colludes with n2, the resultant keys known to both of them would be Keys(nl) U Keys(n2).
Thereafter if n2 and n3 collude, the keys known to n2 and n3 would be Keys@,) U Keys(n2) U Keys(n3). Thus, if multiple nodes collude, they can uncover all employed keys.
In an EBS system, each key combination can be represented in the form of bit strings of k 1's and m O's, where k is the number of keys stored at each node and M is the number of re-key messages required. A value of "1" indicates the node knows the corresponding key. The hamming distance between any two combinations is defmed as the number of bits that the two combinations differ in. Let d be the hamming distance between a pair of key combinations. The value of d is bounded by:
Probability of Capturing the Network
1 ( 4 When two nodes collude, they both will know at least d keys, since d is the number of keys that they differ in. In addition, they will know all keys that are common to both nodes. The common keys are equal to k -dR. Thus, the number of keys known to the two colluding nodes is k + dl2.
This leads us to the conclusion that the lower the hamming distance (d) is, the fewer the number of potentially revealed keys will be. This is illustrated with the help of an example. Consider three nodes w i t h the following key combinations: Since EBS i s based on the distinction between the key Combinations assigned to nodes rather than the keys themselves, a minimum of two nodes would be required to collude in order to reveal all keys used in the system, and a maximum of N nodes will be required when every node knows just one key. Even though storing just one key on every node increases the resilience of the network,, having the parameter k = 1 leads to numerous re-key messages which increases the network overhead and is therefore not a desirable option. Therefore, if 'p' is the probability that a node can be compromised, the probability 'P' for capturing a network of N nodes would be (assuming statistical independence): p' 2 P 2 p N We define a collusion chain to be the transitive closure of a set of colluding nodes so that the union of assigned keys includes.all the k + m keys of the network. Therefore, it is essential that the key combinations be assigned in a careful manner, so that the cardinality (length) of the collusion chain increases. Long chains will decrease the probability of capturing the network (If x nodes are required in the collusion chain, the probability that the network is captured will bep'. Since p < 1, as x increases# decreases).
Since two nodes cannot share their keys without being in direct communication range, we exploit this requirement as well as the location of nodes when assigning keys. We assign key combinations to neighboring nodes such that combinations having a lower hamming distance are assigned to nodes that are physically closer to each other. The advantage gained by this assignment scheme is that even if these nodes collude, they will not have knowledge of all the keys in network. Further cohsions wiII be required to unveil all the keys, which would lower the probability of capturing the network, as we explained above.
Key Assignment Approach
In this section we present a novel approach for diminishing the probability of network capturing through collusion among compromised nodes.
Problem FormuIation.
We represent the assignment problem as a graph G (v, E) where V is the set of N nodes and E represents the set of edges. An edge is said to exist between two nodes if the nodes are in communication range of one another, in which case we refer to them as neighbors.
Each edge is assigned a weight, which is equal to the Euclidean distance between the nodes at each end of the edge. The goal is to assign a unique key combination to each node such that neighbor nodes are assigned combinations with the smallest mutual hamming distances. Edge weights are used to prioritize the neighbors. Close neighbors are favored for combinations of lower hamming distance since they generally stay reachable for a longer time compared to further neighbors whose reachability may deteriorate over time due to increased noise, battery exhaustions or even the placement of obstacles.
Performing such key assignment can be modeled as a register-allocation problem, widely considered in compiling programs, and which tnes to keep most live variables stored in registers for faster execution time [9] . Variables are modeled as vertices and edges exist between variables that are live at the same time. When possible, distinct registers are assigned to the connected nodes to avoid overwrite so that the use of non-register memory is minimized. In our case the key combinations with the smallest hamming distances are to be assigned to connected nodes in order to minimize the probability of network capturing. The register allocation problem is a known NP-hard problem and therefore we pursue a heuristic approach.
Algorithm.
We propose an algorithm that strives to optimize the key assignment locally and proceeds in a greedy fashion to cover the entire network. For every combination KC, of k keys, we calculate the hamming distance dab to every other combination KC,, i.e. V b dab I a r b & b E C(m+k, k). We then sort these combinations (i.e., KC, V b ) in a non-decreasing order of the calculated hamming distances (dab). The problem can now be stated as "given the keys of a node "i', assign key combinations to the nodes { V j 1 (ij) E E } picked in an ascending order of their hamming distance". That is, we start assigning the key combination with the least hamming distance and so on. Since we employ homogenous key combinations, i.e. every combination has k 1's and m O's, the hamming distances will be bounded by equations lla), l(b), I(c) given earlier.
The algorithm starts with the node having the largest number of neighbors, designating it as a root, and proceeds in a breadth first manner. After assigning a key combination CK,,,, to the root, we identify the nodes that are reachable to it (its neighbors) and assign some unused key combinations that have the least hamming distance to CK,,,,. As we mentioned earlier, closer neighbors are favored for combinations that have the least hamming distances to CK,,,,,. Subsequently, for every node that has not been visited, the node's neighbors are identified and key combinations are assigned to each of them. Analogous to graphs, we refer to the neighbors of a node under consideration as its children, Each time-a key combination is assigned to a node, we try to assign keys in such a way that the hamming distance to the key combination of the node's parent is minimal, needless to say that every node is assigned a unique key combination.
Very often, two nodes may share the same parent and be neighbors to each other at the same time. In this case the key assignment has to be done carefully. Our approach calls for assigning key combinations to the nodes so that not only the hamming distances between the parent and the chiIdren are minimized, but also those between any two children that are connected with an edge. This is done by either selecting another unused combination that satisfies the above condition or by swapping the key combinations between the node under consideration and any previously assigned combinations. Since this can lead to potentially trying a11 combinations and making the assignment heuristic lean towards an exhaustive search, we limit the swapping to sibling nodes. Such restriction is logical since we pursue a breadth-first ordering and the impact of key assignment to one node will be limited to those nodes that are on the same level or one level above in the parsing hierarchy. Again, a swap is accepted only if it does not increase the harmning distance between the key combination of the node chosen for swapping and the key sets of all its neighbors. Thus, our approach tries to minimize the maximum hamming distance between any two combinations.
We will illustrate the idea with an example. Let us consider the scenario in Fig 1. For simplicity we assume all links span the same Euclidian distance. We employ the EBS scheme with h=2 and in=3. Tables 1 and 2 enumerate the possible key combinations and their mutua1 hamming distances. Since the node A has the largest degree {5 links), we pick it as a root and assign KCl to it. Then nodes 8, C, D, E and Fare assigned KC2 to KC, respectively and "A" is marked as visited. Next we consider node E and assign KC, to G. While the keys of B and C fit nicely, B and F do not since the hamming distance between KC? and KC6 is high. Because KC7 would not make things better we look for a swap. Since node F has not been visited yet, we can swap its keys with either node C, D or E all of whom have a hamming distance of 2 to the keys of B. Let's just pick E. Thus, F switches to KC, and E gets KC6. It is now the turn for node C , for which the combinations assigned to its neighbors B and D are perfect. Node H is assigned KC,,.
Node D has neighbors C and H with key combinations of Fig.  2 . The detailed algorithm can be found in [lo] .
Validation and Performance Evaluation
To validate our approach, we simulated a network by assigning random positions to nodes and creating an adjacency matrix assuming unified transmission range of 55 meter. The deployment region was set to 500 x 500 m2. This section presents a sample of the simulation results. For an extended analysis, the reader is referred to [lo] .
We experimented with a network of 100 nodes. The k and in parameters were chosen as 3 and 7 respectively. We have randomly picked a set of compromised nodes and checked to see if they could successfully collude to uncover all the keys used in the system. We ran the simulation for different numbers of compromised nodes. The experiments were run 100 times using both our key assignment and the random key assignment methods. We then counted the number of times the network was captured in both cases.
The results are shown in the Fig. 3 . From the figure we can see that the number of times the network was captured under the random key assignment is greater than the number of times it was captured using our approach. When the number of compromised nodes is few, our approach increases the resilience of the network by at least a factor of two compared to the case of random assignment of keys. As more nodes are compromised, the gain starts to decline since it becomes more difficult to defend the network under such high level of attacks. It should be noted that for small networks and large number of key combinations, our approach tends to use the least number of keys since it minimizes the hamming distances among neighbors. In the experiment we have considered the network to be captured when the set of "employed" keys are revealed, which may not be all the allowed k + nt keys.
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Conclusion
EBS provides an efficient way to manage keys in WAHNs.
The basic EBS scheme, however, is prone to collusion attacks that can lead to capturing the entire network. In this paper, we have analyzed the problem of collusion in WAHNs, .in particular when EBS is employed, and The number of times the network was captured due to collusion for varying levels of node compromises proposed a solution for diminishing the threat posed by collusion. We have shown that optimal assignment of key combinations to nodes in order to limit the potential of capturing the network through collusion among compromised nodes is a classical resource allocation problem and is NP-hard in nature. We have introduced a novel heuristic for key assignment that decreases the probability of capturing the network. Our approach exploits the physical proximity of nodes so that a node shares most keys with reachable nodes and thus very few additional keys would be revealed when colluding. Simulation results have confirmed the effectiveness of proposed solution.
